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Abstract 
EXTERNALITIES, THRESHOLDS AND THE MARKETING OF NEW 
AQUACUL TURAL PRODUCTS: THEORY AND EXAMPLES 
Cl em Tisdell, Department of Economics, The University of Queensland 
Brisbane, 4072, Australia, c.tisdell@economics.uq.edu.au 
Identifies and discusses the type and nature of market externalities or spillovers likely 
to be experienced by businesses in developing markets for new aquaculture products or 
in developing previously unexplored markets for existing products. Because 
development of new markets usually requires a substantial investment on the part of a 
business or businesses initially embarking on it, inability of market developers to 
appropriate, as a result of externalities, a substantial share of the economic returns from 
the successful establishment of a new aquaculture market can result in market failure. 
The existence of large thresholds for the minimum level of investment in market 
development needed to establish a new market successfully creates further barriers for 
the establishment of new aquaculture markets. 
Larger firms compared to smaller ones are better placed to overcome the above 
barriers. Furthermore, existing aquaculture businesses usually have economic 
advantages in development of new markets compared to new entrants. The economic 
establishment of new aquaculture products, and aquaculture development generally, 
displays a high degree of path dependence. For instance, the prior existence of 
complementary marketing facilities and activities can be critically important for the 
successful marketing of a new aquaculture product. Examples are given. 
Developers of a new market may generate favourable spillovers for later business 
entrants because (I) they foster acceptance of the new aquaculture product by 
distributors, retailers and consumers; (2) they invest in the development of marketing 
networks, distribution channels and marketing facilities complementary to the sale of 
the new product, and late-comers have some open access to these 'infrastructures' and 
(3) developers generate some public information about the market acceptance of the 
new product and this is of value to late-comers. 
Whether or not governments should provide assistance to early developers of markets 
where development is subject to market failure is discussed. Possible means for 
providing support are outlined. 
1 
Externalities, Thresholds and the Marketing of New 
Aquacultural Products: Theory and Examples. 
1. Introduction 
As pointed out by Lazonick (1991 ), neoclassical economics pays little attention to the 
economics of developing markets for new products or for substantially altered products. 
This is a major shortcoming of orthodox economics given that new commodities play a 
major role in economic development in modem times (cf. Schumpeter, 1942). This 
general deficiency is mirrored in studies of the economics of aquaculture. James 
Anderson (1995) points out that " marketing is critical to the seafood and aquaculture 
sectors, but it is an area that has received little attention to date". This is all the more 
surprising because "Aquaculture is the fastest growing sector of the animal production 
industry worldwide" (APHIS, 1999, p.l) and is frequently attempting to market new or 
substantially modified products. The aquaculture sector generates a high rate of product 
innovation, particularly in countries, such as Australia, where the development of 
aquaculture is in its infancy. 
Lazonick ( 1991) has suggested that g1ven the dynamics of development of new 
markets, large (possibly established) firms are at an advantage compared to small ones 
because of their greater ability to coordinate all stages involved in the production and 
marketing processes. They may be more integrated and large firms usually have been 
established for a longer period than smaller ones. Hence they are likely to have gained 
greater experience and accumulated more knowledge than small firms; but this point is 
not specifically mentioned by Lazonick. He mentions (Lazonick, 1991, p.l92) that 
Chandler (1962) seems to have been the first to suggest that large firms (especially 
multidivisional ones) are likely to be more successful than small firms in marketing 
new products because of their superior ability to coordinate all stages of production and 
marketing processes. But the additional point is made here that large firms are in a 
better position to absorb market start-up costs. 
One might expect this point of view to be just as applicable to new aquacultured 
products as to other products. In fact, Young et al. (1999) argue that large firms do 
have an advantage in marketing aquacultured products compared to small enterprises, 
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particularly small enterprises exporting from developing countries. They suggest, for 
example, that large firms may be able to create a clean green image for their product 
even though their product may in fact be less satisfactory in this respect than supplies 
from smaller enterprises. 
While the coordination element could be one aspect that favours larger firms over 
smaller ones in marketing new products, such as new aquacultured products, there may 
also be other factors which favour larger and established firms, in addition to the 
experience and accumulated knowledge factors already mentioned. 
Economic obstacles in marketing new products (such as new aquacultured products) 
may be classified into those which involve economic thresholds and those involving 
externalities in market development. The latter results in imperfect appropriation of 
economic benefits by developers of new markets. In general, larger firms find these 
obstacles to be less of a hurdle than smaller firms. 
In the context considered here, a new aquacultured product is assumed to be one that 
has not been previously available to consumers from aquaculture. Nevertheless, in 
many cases, a well-established capture fishery for the same product is likely to predate 
the marketing of the aquacultured product. In this case, the captured product and the 
aquacultured product may show a high degree of demand substitutability. In such cases, 
the aquacultured product is not so novel to buyers. However, cases arise in which no or 
an insignificant or patchy market for a captured product predates the aquaculture of the 
product. In such cases, the degree of market novelty of the aquacultured product is 
high. Also, in some cases, a previous market for the captured product may have existed 
but subsequently collapsed due to over harvesting and/or protection of the species 
concerned. In such cases also the market for the product based on aquacultured product 
has to be re-established. If the period of lack of availability of the product from the wild 
has been lengthy, re-establishment of the market will virtually involve the creation of a 
new market. 
This article analyses these obstacles in turn and some policy implications are then 
discussed. The discussion is not confined to consideration of the relative prospects of 
small and large firms in marketing new aquacultured products but takes account of 
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barriers facing all businesses in undertaking market development. Because there is little 
settled economic theory in this area, the analysis in this article is to a considerable 
extent exploratory. 
2. Thresholds, Start-up and Overhead Marketing Costs 
Ideally market development should be modelled as a dynamic multi-period problem. 
But here it will be considered as a simple one-period problem because the aim is to 
identity basic factors which may make for economic success or failure in marketing 
new ( aquacultured) products. 
In order not to complicate the analysis and so as to focus on marketing costs, it will be 
assumed that the new product to be marketed can be produced at constant per-unit cost 
and that all firms deciding to produce it experience the same per unit production costs. 
This can be relaxed later. 
It is assumed that marketing and distribution costs for a new product can be divided 
into start -up or overhead costs and variable costs. A very important consideration for a 
business is the volume of sales or sales revenue needed to break-even. The business 
risk involved in marketing the new product increases with the size of this threshold. 
For simplicity, assume that the total cost function of the firms is linear and can be 
represented by 
C = a+bX (I) 
where C is total cost, X is volume of sales (equals output) and a and b are parameters. 
Parameter a represents overhead or start-up marketing costs in this case and b is per 
unit marketing plus production costs. If A represents per unit production costs, variable 
marketing costs are b - A . 
For simplicity, total revenue, R, can also be assumed to be linear. Hence, 
R=pX (2) 
where p is a constant price. However, if the revenue function increases monotonically 
as a function of the quantity of sales the same general mathematical results are 
obtained. 
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In the above case, other things equal, the break-even quantity of sales is higher, the 
larger is a, marketing start-up, costs or the larger is ( b- A), variable marketing costs. 
Considerable marketing set-up costs and higher variable costs (including distribution 
costs) of marketing new products increase the riskiness of an enterprise. 
This is illustrated in Figure I where the line ODG represents total revenue. The total 
cost line ADF shows lower set-up marketing costs, OA, than the total cost line BGH for 
which start-up marketing costs are OB. In addition, the slope of ADF is less than for 
BGH, indicating lower per unit variable marketing costs in the former case. The break­
even volume of sales, X2, is much higher in the case involving high start-up marketing 
costs than in the other case where the break -even point is a volume of X1 of sales. 
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Figure 1 Higher start-up marketing costs plus per unit variable 
costs increase the riskiness of attempting to introduce 
new aquacultural products. 
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Differences in marketing start-up costs seem to be very important in influencing the 
break-even point. Higher start-up costs will result in a higher break-even point, even if 
associated variable per unit marketing costs are the same or somewhat higher than 
otherwise. 
Note that although linearity has been assumed in the above discussion, provided that 
cost functions and the revenue function increase monotonically, the general results 
continue to hold. 
Market start -up costs for business may consist of one or more of the following 
components: 
I) Costs of establishing a customer network e.g. of retailers. 
2) Costs of convincing potential customers to try and accept the new product. 
3) If the product requires specialised storage facilities or treatment, then there will 
be costs in communicating this to potential customers. 
4) Sometimes specialised complementary storage or treatment facilities may be 
needed for a new product e.g. by retailers. These will involve an upfront 
investment. In some cases, the supplier may have to provide these facilities in 
order to get a foothold in the market. 
5) If a suitable distribution network for the product does not exist, the supplier of a 
new product may have upfront costs in establishing such a network or 
modifying an existing network. 
Upfront costs will generally be lower for a business attempting to market a new product 
if it can tap existing customer networks and if the product has substantial similarities 
with products which are already being marketed. In the latter case, those involved in 
marketing the product may be able to use facilities already used for storing or treating 
existing products. Furthermore, it may be possible to tap existing distribution channels 
in such a case. 
Attempts to market aquacultured giant clams, Tridacna, provide an example. A market 
for such clams for the aquarium market developed quickly because specialist 
distributors, retailers and customers for tropical light -dependent aquaria species already 
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existed. Existing marketing networks and facilities could easily be tapped (cf. Tisdell et 
al., Part Ill). 
By contrast, the market for giant clams for fresh food in the restaurant trade, for 
example, has failed to develop rapidly. In fact, it appears to have developed hardly at 
all. One reason could be that specialist equipment is needed to transport live clams and 
to store these in restaurants. To provide such equipment requires a substantial upfront 
investment. Furthermore, compared to other species often held in tanks at restaurants, 
additional specialised knowledge is required to care of live Tridacna. Furthermore, 
many potential customers are unaware of the taste of giant clams and chefs may have to 
learn about suitable gastronomic ways to present these. Clearly the upfront cost of 
establishing a food market for live giant clams is much greater than that involved in 
marketing giant clams for the aquarium market. No doubt less difficulty would be 
experienced from a marketing point of view in selling the frozen adductor muscle or the 
chilled meat of giant clams for food because this could make use of existing marketing 
channels. Nevertheless, given the production costs involved, it may not be a profitable 
activity. 
It is worth emphasizing that the cost of establishing a market for a new product tends to 
be to be lower if the product is as a close substitute for existing products. Both up front 
marketing costs plus variable promotion and marketing costs can be expected to be 
much lower when a new product is a close substitute for an existing one or ones. If it is 
an aquacultured food product, existing recipes, cooking methods and means of 
presentation can be used and preparation and storage methods will be much the same as 
with the existing product or product. The taste, texture and other qualities of the new 
product are likely to be similar to its existing close substitutes. 
For example, Australia has a fledgling industry for eel aquaculture and two endemic 
species are being cultured on the east coast namely the longfin eel Anguilla reinhardtii 
and shortfin eel Anguilla australis. Because the Australian shortfin eel is very similar to 
the species Anguilla japonica favoured in the Japanese market, the potential for 
marketing Anguilla australis in Japan is excellent. However, the Japanese do not favour 
the longfin eel so there is little prospect for marketing it in Japan. However, it is 
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preferred by the Chinese. So a potential export market may exist among the Chinese for 
Anguilla reinhardtii (NSW Fisheries, 2000a). 
Another example is provided by the evolving Australian freshwater crayfish industry. 
Whereas freshwater crayfish aquaculture in the rest of the world (southern United 
States, Spain and other countries) is based on the red swamp crayfish, Procambarus 
clarkii, the Australian industry relies on three native species of the genus Cherax. 
These are the yabbie Cherax destructor which occurs naturally over a wide range in 
eastern Australia, the marron C. tenuimanus which is native to southwest Western 
Australia and the redclaw C. quadricarinatus which is naturally distributed throughout 
northern Queensland and the Northern Territory. 
It seems that he Australian species can be easily substituted for European species. NSW 
Fisheries (2000b, p.3) reports: 
"The size of any export market is impossible to evaluate until supply can be 
maintained. There is certainly a market for crayfish in Europe, as crayfish are regarded 
as a delicacy and local stocks have been largely wiped out by the "crayfish plague". 
However, the markets in some European countries (for example, Sweden) are highly 
seasonal. Trial shipments have suggested that the Cherax species would be accepted in 
the market place. Some products have also been exported and well received in Asia, so 
there is also potential there. The success of further export trade will be largely 
dependent on volume and continuity of supply". 
Given modem marketing methods and outlets, adequate volume and continuity of 
supply as well as its standardisation are often important for establishing new markets. 
Usually larger firms are in a better position to fulfil these requirements than smaller 
ones. 
A multi-product established business (these are usually larger sized businesses) is likely 
to be at an economic advantage in marketing a new aquacultural product compared to a 
new entrant, especially if the new entrant supplies a single product. Economies of scope 
(Baumol et al., 1984) are likely to be quite substantial in marketing. Overheads 
involved in marketing can often be shared between a number of products so reducing 
the upfront costs for marketing a new product. Furthermore, multi-product firms are 
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diversified and this reduces their economic risks. Also, larger firms are more likely to 
be multi-product ones than small firms. In these circumstances, larger firms experience 
lower upfront costs for marketing new products and face lower risks than smaller 
businesses. 
In general, the view that large multi-product firms are likely to have a competitive 
advantage in marketing new products is consistent with that of Chandler (1962, 1977, 
1990; cf. Lazonick, 1991). However this view does not solely depend on the 
coordination argument of Chandler. 
Small new businesses selling a single new product appear to be in the most vulnerable 
position because they usually lack experience in marketing, do not have developed 
marketing networks to tap and cannot spread their marketing costs across several 
products marketed jointly. The latter two factors imply that their overhead costs 
represented say in Figure I by OB tend to be higher than for larger multi-product firms 
who may have lower overhead costs for launch of a new product such as indicated by 
OA in Figure I. Furthermore, a smaller firm compared to larger one may not be able to 
obtain discounts or to achieve as low a variable cost in marketing and distribution of its 
product because of its overall smaller volume of transactions. So its cost curve (as 
shown in Figure I by line BGH) will tend to rise more quickly than that for a larger 
multi-product firm, which may have a cost curve with a lower slope like that shown by 
line ADF. This is not to say that a small one-product firm will necessarily fail to 
establish a new market, but suggests that the risk of its failure is high compared to a 
large, established multi-product firm. 
A large established company is likely to have an additional advantage in marketing a 
new aquacultured product compared to a small newcomer - it is likely to have 
considerable market goodwill. Therefore, if the name of a large established company is 
associated with a new product, its supplies of the new product are more likely to be 
tried and accepted by potential buyers. The company's name can be used as a 
favourable signal. Consequently such a company, other things equal, is likely to have 
lower upfront market costs and variable marketing cots in establishing a market for a 
new aquacultured product than is the case for a small firm just entering the industry. 
Naturally, if the large firms reputation is already established for aquacultured products 
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this will be an advantage to it in marketing. However, even if it has not previously been 
producing in aquaculture but its name is well known for other products, this can also be 
favourable to its new market development. 
A small firm or set of small firms may be at a disadvantage in establishing a new 
market for another reason. A significantly large investment may be required in 
establishing some markets and a considerable lapse of time may occur before the 
market is established on any significant scale. A small new product firm or such a set of 
small firms may not be able to raise the funds to overcome this threshold and finance 
the waiting time required for a return on this investment. This may be partially due to 
capital market failure, but probably also reflects the high risks involved in making 
finance available to a smaller specialised firm in such circumstances. 
Nevertheless, a set of small firms can sometimes successfully overcome the type of 
thresholds indicated by Figure 2. It sometimes happens that a significant group of small 
firms attempts simultaneously and independently to establish the market for a new 
aquaculture product, and their combined effort may exceed the critical mass needed to 
establish the market. In such a case, their massed, but uncoordinated efforts, bring 
benefits to all suppliers of the new product. 
Given the above mentioned market thresholds, firms are likely to experience significant 
synergies in establishing the market for a new product, even if each wishes to carve out 
a submarket for itself. On the other hand, once the market is established this synergistic 
marketing effect between firms (a positive spill over elements) can be expected to 
become weaker. This phenomenon involves both thresholds and marketing externalities 
but has been given little attention in traditional economics, presumably because of its 
preoccupation of traditional economics with situations involving comparative statics 
(Komai, 1971 ). 
There is, however, no guarantee that those who successfully establish the market for a 
new aquacultural product will be able to appropriate all or most of producers' benefits 
from doing this. Latecomers may obtain positive market spillovers from early 
developers of a market. Consider this matter. 
10 
A simple heuristic illustration of this situation is given in Figure 2. In this figure, the 
curve OABC shows the size of the market created (e.g. in terms of an index of height 
and slope of the product's demand curve) for a new aquacultured product as a function 
of upfront investment in establishing it. Unless at least X1 is invested upfront to 
establish the market considered in Figure 2, it fails to eventuate. Further investment 
expands the size of the market first at an increasing rate than at a decreasing rate after 
market upfront investment exceeds Xz. For an investment of X3 in upfront 
establishment of the market, the size of the market per unit of up front investment is at a 
maximum. 
Indicator of 
size of 
market 
established 
0 
A 
Upfront investment in establishing market for 
new product 
X 
Figure 2 Threshold followed by initial scale economies in upfront 
investment in establishing a new market 
3. Externalities - Lack of Appropriation of Economic Benefits from Marketing 
Effort 
The above discussion implicitly assumes that firms establishing a market for a new 
product can appropriate all (or at least most) of the economic benefits (for suppliers) 
from doing this. But in most cases, this is an unrealistic assumption. It is only likely to 
be satisfied if there are substantial barriers of entry to the new market once it is 
established. 
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Strong protection by patents could constitute such a barrier. But many new aquacultural 
products are unable to benefit from patent or similar protection. Small new firms in 
comparison to larger established ones are likely to find it more difficult to take 
advantage of patent protection, if it is in fact available, and will usually find it more 
difficult to establish a brand name and brand loyalty. Small new firms have quite 
limited ability to protect their investment in developing a new market from the entry of 
subsequent rivals. Clearly industry dynamics or evolution needs to be considered. 
Subsequent entrants to a newly developed market obtain several types of positive 
economic spillovers from those who initially develop new markets. These spillovers 
include: 
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I) Generation of knowledge about the market. Information becomes available to 
later market entrants or potential entrants about the size and nature of the 
market and this information is generated by those who undertake the effort of 
establishing the market initially. 
2) Initial market developers may have to overcome the upfront market investment 
threshold discussed in relation to Figure 2, and subsequent market entrants may 
free-ride on these efforts of earlier entrants. 
3) In general, early developers of a market through their efforts and market 
investment, increase awareness of and potential acceptance of new product by 
potential buyers or actually introduce new buyers to a product. Subsequent 
entrants to the newly established market often free-ride on these actions by early 
developers of a market. 
4) Suppliers who are late-comers to a new market are often able to tap marketing 
networks established by market developers, and in general take advantage of 
market infrastructure established by developers of a market. Note that this 
infrastructure may include an institutional or social component. For instance, if 
marketing must meet various (sometimes new) government requirements, 
developers of a market may have to invest considerable resources to ensure that 
the regulatory mechanisms are economically workable. 
Observe that while it may frequently be the case that later arrivals in a new market take 
market share away from market developers, this is not always so. In some markets, cost 
conditions may be such that no supplier would find it economical to satisfy a 
substantial fraction of market demand for a new product. The possibility exists for 
some markets that up to a point synergy or complementarity in market development 
exists between early entrants. Where natural economic conditions are such that a new 
industry would be supplied by many small firms, the simultaneous attempted 
establishment of the new industry by a critical minimum mass of small firms may be 
necessary for its successful establishment. A critical mass of early market developers 
may be needed to ensure that the type of market threshold indicated in Figure 2 is 
overcome and that the upfront costs in developing market infrastructure and for 
acceptance of a new product are shared. However, there appears to be no 'natural' 
mechanism to ensure or coordinate the massing of those prepared to develop a new 
market. Nevertheless, it can occur as a result of a wave of business optimism, 
encouraged, for example, by media reports. 
Market development spillovers constitute a serious barrier to the establishment of 
markets for new products which are generic in nature, as is frequently the case for new 
aquacultural products. Large, established, multi-product firms are probably in the best 
position to develop such markets successfully. Furthermore, if they enter an emerging 
market pioneered by small firm after a slight Jag, these large firms may be in a superior 
position to capture substantial market shares and capitalize on the investment and 
efforts of small firms in developing the market initially. 
The costs of complying with government regulations should not be underestimated as 
impediment to the establishment of markets for new aquacultured products or to the 
successful economic establishment of new aquacultural industries. Often there is 
inflexibility in adjusting existing regulations to meet the needs of new industries and 
the brunt of obtaining adjustments generally falls on those who first enter the industry. 
In an industry survey, Bush and Anderson (1993) "found that regulatory issues, 
including access to lease sites, predator control, disease management, water access, 
water discharge and others, are the number one constraint to aquaculture in the United 
States. Such regulations have essentially shut down aquaculture in some states. Alaska 
presently has a permanent moratorium on private, for-profit finfish aquaculture. In 
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other states, such as Maine, the substantial cost of regulation has contributed to 
increased [business] concentration" (Anderson, 1995). In Australia, manne prawn 
(shrimp) aquaculture has become increasingly concentrated (NSW Fisheries, 2000c, 
p.l ). This may also be partly a response to government regulation (larger firms might 
have greater ability to cope with such regulations) as well as other advantages, such as 
marketing advantages, of large firms. 
Many large firms are also in an excellent position to act as middlemen in developing 
markets for new products, that is as processors, distributors and marketers. As a result, 
they may also capture most of the rents to be earned from the introduction of a new 
product. 
The speed of entry of suppliers of a new market is an important dimension to consider. 
In some cases, rapid entry of those who enter a new market with a Jag will lower the 
economic benefits of initial market developers, although it should result in a greater 
gain for consumers. However, this is not universally the situation. As pointed out 
earlier, clustering or massing of early entrants resulting in a critical minimum collective 
effort can sometimes benefit all. This possibility does not appear to have been 
previously recognised in the literature. 
4. Policy Considerations 
The above analysis demonstrates that market failures can arise in the development of 
markets for new products because of marketing effort thresholds and the presence of 
market development spillovers. When market failures occur, there may be a case for 
government intervention to improve the operation of markets. 
In relation to established products examples exist of government intervention to 
strengthen mechanisms for their market promotion. For example, in relation to wool in 
the past a compulsory levy was imposed on wool-growers in several countries to 
provide funds for the collective promotion of the use of wool as a generic product 
through the International Wool Secretariat. The rationale for this is that few or no wool­
growers would be prepared to promote wool because of market spillovers but all wool 
suppliers would benefit in economic terms from promotion. 
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Marketing effort took the form of 'brand' identification of wool as a fibre e.g. by use of 
the 'Woolmark' (Tisdell and McDonald, 1979). The Australian Govermnent also 
subsidised the promotion efforts of producers. Similarly California orange-growers 
have had a collective scheme to promote their product. 
However, promoting the market for an existing product is rather different from market 
development for a new product. For an existing product, a substantial population of 
suppliers who may benefit from this promotion already exists and can be identified. 
This provides a base for collective enforced contributions to a product market 
development fund. Also, in such case, suppliers may constitute a significant political 
interest group and be able to exert pressure on govermnent to subsidise the promotion 
of their generic product. 
By contrast, in a newly emerging market or a potentially new one, the population of 
eventual beneficiaries is unclear and they are unlikely to have formed a significant 
political interest group. In such cases, collective action in promoting the market for a 
new product is unlikely and govermnent support or a subsidy to establish such a market 
is unlikely. An exception could, however, occur where the new product would be a 
sideline for many producers already established in the same industry. These producers 
may form a special interest political pressure group. 
On the whole, market failure in developing markets for new products is likely to be 
more widespread and persistent than such failure in relation to the marketing of 
established products, even when these products are of a generic nature. Govermnent 
support or intervention appears to be least likely in the former case. 
In some cases, govermnents provide support for research and development designed to 
produce or improve new products. This is common both for primary agricultural and 
aquacultural production. But the ability to supply physically a new product which has 
the potential to be a market success does not ensure this success. Failures in the 
processes involved in marketing can result in markets not being established for new 
products even when their establishment would confer a social economic gain. No 
perfect solution to this economic conundrum seems to exist. 
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Nevertheless, governments can play a positive (even if somewhat limited role) in 
supporting the emergence of markets for new aquaculture products. While research and 
development (R&D) does not in itself create new markets, government assistance 
within R&D can reduce the initial total cost burden of businesses developing a new 
aquacultural industry and can make for a more marketable product. In some cases, the 
government may also be able to provide assistance with generic promotion of a new 
product. 
While, as mentioned earlier, an emerging industry may usually not be able to form an 
effective political lobby group, there can be special circumstances where it might do so 
at an early date. One such situation is where the emerging aquaculture product could 
constitute an important side-line to existing aquaculture production. In such cases, 
producers of existing aquaculture products may form an effective lobby group. 
Secondly, if the new aquaculture promises to stimulate employment and economic 
growth in a lagging region(s), regional pressure groups may press the government to 
support it. Thus regional development imperatives may sometimes ensure early 
government support for an emerging industry. 
Government bodies can also play an important role in prescribing standards for 
products of a new aquaculture industry. While excessive government regulation can 
stifle the development of a new aquacultural product, regulation in some cases can 
ensure the sustainable development of the market for a new aquacultural product. 
Where quality of the product is not easily detectable by inspection, regulation of quality 
or appropriate identification of quality may be needed to ensure that the market for a 
new aquaculture product develops and survives. Otherwise, as pointed out in the 
economic literature (Akerlof, 1970; Varian, 1996, Ch.35), poor quality products may 
drive out superior quality products or the market for the product may collapse 
completely. Suppliers of superior products experience an adverse market externality or 
spillover from suppliers of unidentified poor quality products. This adverse externality, 
arising from asymmetry in the information of sellers and buyers of a product, may be a 
serious impediment to the emergence of a new market, in which most buyers are 
learning about the characteristics of the new product for the first time. 
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In such circumstances, there can be a case for the government to regulate the quality of 
a new aquacultural product. The regulation may extend beyond health considerations to 
include measures to ensure that marketed aquacultured products do not have off­
flavours, as discussed below. It may be that in the longer term industry Codes of 
Conduct, or brand names or other means can be found to address this issue. 
An example is the recent aquaculture in Australia of the silver perch Bidyanus 
bidyanus, a species naturally distributed throughout the Murray-Darling Basin. It is 
being increasingly cultivated in farm dams. NSW Fisheries (2000d, p.3) states 
"Like most freshwater fish, silver perch has a tendency to develop a muddy 
flavour. This occurs as a result of fatty tissues in the fish absorbing compounds released 
by blue green algae in the culture ponds. The only way to remove the off-flavour is by 
purging in clean water for 3-21 days, depending on the extent of tainting. Purging the 
fish in clean water expels the compounds that cause off-taste, and the fish is then ready 
for market". 
Issue of permits to growers of silver perch in NSW is subject to growers providing 
facilities for purging silver perch before sale. This, however does not ensure that the 
process will be carried out or that purging occurs for a sufficiently long period. 
However, where growers directly supply live perch to restaurants, restaurant-owners 
would be able to detect poor quality due to inadequate purging and identify the grower 
responsible, albeit after the event. Thus the buyer can impose a penalty on the grower. 
But as the market expands and identification of suppliers becomes more difficult, and if 
impersonal sales develop through markets, quality control remains a serious problem. 
Industry self-regulation, especially in the early stages of market development, may be 
unable to address the issue effectively, and government regulation may be desirable. It 
can be required and be economically justified in many cases. 
Purging often results in much better quality freshwater cultured spec1es for food. 
Another example is Australian crayfish. For instance, "yabbies feed on detritus 
(decaying matter) often resulting in the flavour of their flesh being tainted with an off­
flavour. Yabbies are much tastier if their gut has been emptied after harvesting and 
prior to sale in order to improve the flavour" (NSW Fisheries, 2000e, p.l ). Market 
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acceptance of this product will be higher if purging is regularly and adequately carried 
out prior to sale. 
The subject of standards for aquacultural products, especially new aquacultural 
products, is a complex one. But governments can play a valuable role in helping to 
regulate such standards or in requiring the appropriate identification of the standard of 
an aquacultured product. This can be especially important in emerging markets which 
may be highly sensitive to variations in standards, especially to the undisclosed sale of 
poor quality product. While private warranties, trade marks and private brands (as well 
as possibly industry Codes of Conduct) may provide some market protection, these 
private responses may be weak in an emerging market and also limit sales of generic 
product. Despite the limitations of government regulation, there is a case for 
government regulation of quality standards in many emerging markets for aquaculture 
products. 
5. Discussion and Concluding Comments 
Industries such as aquaculture and agriculture seem especially prone to failures in the 
development of markets for new products. This is because of the presence in most cases 
of small firms in these industries and because of the generic nature of much of their 
production. This article identifies market thresholds and spillovers in promotion of new 
products as potentially very important sources of market failure in such cases. While 
governments might help moderate these failures, it has been argued that they are less 
likely to do so than in the case of established generic products. However, important 
roles exist for public intervention in the development of aquaculture markets. 
The degree of market novelty of an aquacultured product depends on the availability of 
close market substitutes. In many cases, wild-caught products provide close substitutes 
for aquacultured ones e.g. Atlantic salmon. In such cases, marketing thresholds and 
market externalities involved in introducing the aquacultured product to the market 
may be slight. Hence, small-sized firms may not be at a substantial disadvantage in 
entering such a market selling aquacultured products compared to large firms. 
Nevertheless, marketing thresholds and externalities may not be completely absent. For 
example, the aquacultured product may require the use or establishment of new 
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existence for the captured product and no very close substitutes in existence, marketing 
threshold and externality constraints on the development of the new product are likely 
to be high, and the market failures outlined above of substantial importance. 
It might be noted also that this article highlights both market barriers on the demand 
side, as indicated by the degree of substitutability of an aquacultured product with other 
products, as well as marketing supply constraints such as the absence or otherwise of 
available marketing networks, market distribution and storage technologies. While 
demand substitutability is often given considerable attention by economists, supply-side 
marketing constraints have been relatively neglected. 
The analysis given here is purely exploratory and now needs to be developed with 
greater precision and linked to empirical studies of the development of markets for 
particular aquacultured products. 
As shown by Aarset (1999), there are many factors (both supply-side and demand-side 
factors) that influence the evolution of a new aquaculture industry. Even though the 
development of Atlantic salmon farming in Norway could be pioneered by small farms 
and benefited from a number of favourable conditions, such as a pre-existing market for 
salmon, its evolution was by no means straightforward or easy (Aarset, 1999, pp.l79-
182). Nevertheless, the development of an Arctic char farming industry has proven to 
be more difficult for reasons outlined by Aarset (1999). Those reasons include early 
opposition to development of this industry by the salmon industry because of its 
perceived market threats to Atlantic salmon. 
Economists have g1ven little attention to the processes of market development. 
Neoclassical economics has concentrated on static analysis but this cannot be used for 
analysing the emergence of markets for new products. While many members of the 
Austrian School of Economics (e.g. Hayek, 1948) have emphasised the importance of 
studying economic processes, their emphasis has mostly been on economic processes 
underlying established markets. At least, this has been true for Hayek (1948). On the 
other hand, Schumpeter (1942), also Austrian-trained, has emphasised the importance 
of studying processes involved in market innovation, processes not captured by 
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traditional economic approaches. As a growing and developing sector of the global 
economy, aquaculture provides excellent opportunities to study such processes. 
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